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At a superficial level, the design of 
macroeconomic policy for resource-rich 
countries would seem a simple task. The 
policy goals should be quite obvious: strong 
growth, economic diversification and poverty 
reduction. With rare exceptions, these 
countries are not constrained by the supply of 
foreign exchange, nor should the 
governments be budget constrained. The 
combination of obvious goals and relative lack 
of constraints would seem to be a recipe for 
success. 
But appearances are misleading. Many 
resource-rich countries have failed to achieve 
growth, diversification and poverty reduction 
compared to countries without natural 
resource endowments. Researchers have 
offered ostensible analytical accounts of the 
frequent failures to achieve the development 
potential that should accompany natural 
resource endowments. The Dutch Disease, 
described above, is one of these stories, and in 
recent years, some discussions of corruption 
and conflict have been influential. Although 
methodologically problematic, researchers 
have argued that resource-rich economies do 
not experience stable and sustained growth 
over time (Sachs & Warner, 2001)1. High rates 
of poverty and inequality are common (Ross, 
2007)2. Resource wealth typically aggravates 
the onset, intensity and duration of conflict 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004)3.   
Indonesia is among the few exceptions in 
terms of diversifying its economy. Petroleum 
became a minor contributor to foreign 
exchange earnings. The share of oil and gas in 
domestic revenues declined from 49 per cent in 
1982 to 23 per cent in 2005. Two major 
policies contributed to this success: (a) direct 
support to agriculture and industry (mainly 
manufacturing textiles and footwear) through 
subsidies and tax incentives; and (b) at a later 
stage, careful transitions from import 
substitution to export-led growth.   
The examples at the other extreme are 
Nigeria and Yemen, which are dependent on 
petroleum for over ninety percent of their 
exports. Botswana also suffers from high 
unemployment, related to reliance on capital-
intensive diamond mining and cattle exports. 
The economy is not adequately diversified. 
Labour-intensive manufacturing still 
contributes no more than 4 to 5 per cent of 
GDP. The total unemployment rate averaged 
22 per cent for the two decades leading up to 
2006. The youth unemployment rate was 33 
per cent. 
 As Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008, p. 
617)4 note, however: “economic advisors 
should be aware that natural resources do not 
necessarily spell doom for development. 
Instead, their exploitation can be a valuable 
part of a sustainable development strategy”. It 
is our hypothesis that the failure to realize the 
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development promise of natural resource 
endowments is the result of inappropriate 
macroeconomic policy.  
Our argument is that resource-rich 
countries experience frequent periods of 
dramatic foreign exchange inflows. These 
periods of dramatic price increases result in 
sudden appreciations of their currencies, 
unless the public authorities prevent it. This 
appreciation undermines the profitability of all 
other tradeable goods, which results in a 
decline of manufacturing and agriculture. This 
is not the Dutch Disease process, which is 
specified in the analytical context of full 
employment, then transferred – 
inappropriately – to economies with 
substantial resources. 
Public authorities need to intervene to 
prevent the market distortions created by the 
resource boom. The major tasks of 
macroeconomic policy in the short term are 
preventive: preventing excessive overheating 
of the economy, preventing appreciation of 
the exchange rate, and preventing relative 
price changes that would make the short term 
a precursor of the medium term with 
declining tradeable sectors.  
Fiscal policy should be carried out with a 
discipline that prevents excessive increases in 
aggregate demand and accumulates a reserve 
of revenue that can be drawn upon when 
export prices fall. There is plenty of 
experience in this area. For instance, Timor 
Leste followed the Norwegian model and set 
up a Petroleum Fund in 2005. The fund is 
expected to total US$ 8 billion by 2012 
(Gomes & Hailu, 2009)5. In Angola, revenues 
generated by an oil price higher than the 
“reference level” are not spent, but deposited 
in an oil reserve fund. While saving a portion 
of revenues might make sense, excessively 
diverting resources away from critical 
investments is not developmental, especially 
in the least-developed countries where public 
investments are crucially needed. 
On the revenue side, income from the 
resource sector needs to be maximized. 
However, there are many challenges. 
Multinational companies often negotiate 
“lock-in contracts” with low royalty and tax 
rates. These contracts are meant to deal with 
the so-called “time-inconsistency problem”: 
the notion that there is uncertainty as to 
whether agreements are honoured or reversed 
in the future. In Peru, companies have been 
able to negotiate fixed tax rates for up to 10 
years. The experiences of Zambia and Chile 
provide a good example of contrasts. In Chile, 
the state-owned company holds a 39 per cent 
stake in the mining sector. The company pays 
a 29 per cent tax rate. In contrast, the 
Zambian government holds a nominal 10 per 
cent stake in Anglo-American, with no 
dividends received up to 2007. The estimates 
show that Zambia loses about US$ 50 million 
per annum in foregone tax revenues due to 
exemptions, concessions, refund claims and 
provisions (Bova, 2009; Fraser & Lungu, 
2007)6 7.  
Monetary policy often supports fiscal 
policy through use of the central bank rate to 
restrain credit. However, the central bank rate 
is not always an effective instrument. 
Attempts to constrain credit growth may 
result in dysfunctionally high commercial 
bank rates that undermine productive 
investment. To complement a policy of 
moderately high interest rates, the central 
bank can employ instruments that act on the 
balance sheets of commercial banks and 
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influence their capacity to expand credit. 
Regulation of reserves is a useful approach. 
Exchange rate policy is straight-forward; 
the strategy is managing the currency to 
prevent appreciation. With foreign exchange 
reserves, maintaining a fixed exchange rate is a 
relatively easy task. There is potential conflict 
between the central bank constraining credit 
growth and entering into foreign exchange 
purchases to manage the currency. As noted 
above, acting on commercial bank balance 
sheets is the mechanism to manage this 
conflict. 
In the medium-term, fiscal policy plays the 
most important role. Public investment 
becomes the major instrument to promote the 
central policy objective – growth and 
diversification of the non-resource tradeable 
sectors. Provision of infrastructure should 
focus on directly facilitating tradeable 
production. One of the most frequent and 
obvious symptoms of a dysfunctional 
resource-rich economy is the construction 
boom. Investments in trade related transport 
and technical education to support agriculture 
and manufacturing are some of the alternative 
public investments that can foster tradeables.  
On the revenue side, policies need to focus 
on broadening the tax base and introducing 
direct taxes. Reducing excessive inequality 
creates a virtuous cycle of increases in 
household incomes. This would enlarge the 
domestic market by raising consumption and 
stimulating labour demand. These, in turn, 
would increase income and public revenue 
(Hailu & Soares, 2009)8. 
Monetary policy needs to focus on 
facilitating private investment to diversify into 
non-resource tradeables and to support 
exchange rate management. Chile has been 
successful in its economic diversification 
strategy. While mining makes up about two-
thirds of exports, it only employs less than 
one per cent of the labour force. The strategy 
entailed policy incentives to the private sector 
designed to promote wine-making, fruit-
culture and salmon farming. These included 
credit and subsidies for these sectors as well as 
support for R&D spending (Hailu, et al., 2011; 
Havro & Santiso, 2008)9 10. 
A free floating exchange regime is not 
likely to work in protecting the non-resource 
tradeable sectors. The policy need is to focus 
on maintaining a constant real exchange rate 
to diversify into other non-resource 
tradeables. The recent international food price 
increases indicate that global demand for 
agricultural products presents new export 
opportunities. Uzbekistan’s experience 
provides another appropriate policy lesson. 
The country experienced shocks due to 
declines in the price of its major exports, 
mainly energy. The policy makers, however, 
took actions to diversify the country’s exports. 
Between the periods 1995 to 1999 and 2003 
to 2006, non-oil exports as a share of total 
exports had increased by 12 per cent. 
Investments in domestic agriculture led to a 
decrease in the share of food in total imports 
from 22 per cent to 9 per cent (McKinley, 
2008)11.  
The basic elements of the macroeconomic 
policy framework for resource-rich economies 
are given in Table 1 of the Appendix. 
 
Country-Specifics and Limitations in 
Implementation 
The feasibility and success of 
macroeconomic policy will depend on specific 
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policy designs adapted to each country’s 
unique characteristics. This caveat applies to 
countries that may have many features in 
common. For example, Nigeria and 
Cameroon are both petroleum exporters, but 
the former can exercise an independent 
monetary policy while the latter cannot. The 
constraint arises because of currency 
arrangements. In the less flexible form, as in 
the case of Cameroon, a country adopts the 
currency of another country or enters a 
common currency agreement, such as in the 
CFA or franc (now euro) zone in West Africa. 
The more flexible form of this constraint is a 
fixed link to another currency, such as the 
arrangement between Lesotho and South 
Africa. 
The practical result of such currency 
arrangements is that the major monetary and 
exchange rate tools are not available. All that 
remains of monetary policy is a limited scope 
to issue bonds and conduct financial sector 
oversight. Fiscal policy is also limited, 
restricted to allocation of expenditure and to 
the adjustment of tax coverage and rates. 
Even without a formal deficit rule, financing 
expenditures is difficult with a common 
currency because of restrictions on issuing 
bonds. The macroeconomic guidelines 
developed in this paper, therefore, do not 
fully apply to the countries constrained by 
currency agreements.  
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Table 1  
Macroeconomic Policy Options for Resource-Rich Countries 
 
 








Fiscal Policy Expenditure: Prevent over-heating and 
create a reserve fund for countercyclical 
intervention and investment. 
Major task is to restrain recurrent 
expenditure. 
 Revenue: Maximize income from resource 
flows by setting appropriate royalties and 
tax rates. 
Vigilance is required to prevent 
revenue loss from transfer pricing 




Use central bank rate and regulation of 
commercial bank reserves to prevent 
excessive inflationary pressures. 
Private sector investment in non-
tradable sectors may be the main 
source of inflationary pressure.  
Exchange 
Rate Policy 
Employ fixed exchange rate regime to 
prevent nominal appreciation. 
Immediate task may be to tackle 
trade deficit. 









Fiscal Policy Expenditure: Public investment to 
encourage and facilitate diversification into 
non-resource tradeables. 
Typical problem in resource-rich 
countries is the relative or 
absolute decline of non-resource 
tradeables. 
 
 Revenue: Broaden direct tax base; prevent 
excessive inequality. 
Challenges to policy include 
inequality, corruption and failure 
to diversify tax base. 
Monetary 
Policy 
Facilitate private investment to diversify 
into non-resource tradeables and support 
exchange rate management. 
Central banks need to balance 
monetary expansion, with the 




Maintain constant real exchange rate to 
diversify tradeables. 
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